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Abstract
We describe research on a comprehensive ontology of
sociotechnical and organizational factors for insider
threat (SOFIT) and results of an expert knowledge
elicitation study. The study examined how alternative
insider threat assessment models may reflect
associations
among
constructs
beyond
the
relationships defined in the hierarchical class
structure. Results clearly indicate that individual
indicators contribute differentially to expert judgments
of insider threat risk. Further, models based on
ontology class structure more accurately predict expert
judgments. There is some (although weak) empirical
evidence that other associations among constructs—
such as the roles that indicators play in an insider
threat exploit—may also contribute to expert
judgments of insider threat risk. These findings
contribute to ongoing research aimed at development
of more effective insider threat decision support tools.

1. Introduction
A serious threat is posed by insiders who seek to
destroy, steal, or leak sensitive information, or act in
ways that expose their organization to outside attacks.
An insider threat is “a current or former employee,
contractor, or other business partner who has or had
authorized access to an organization’s network,
system, or data and who intentionally (or
unintentionally) exceeds or misuses that access to
negatively affect the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of the organization’s information or
information systems” [1]. Annual industry surveys
consistently show that insiders pose the second greatest
cybersecurity threat, exceeded only by hackers, and
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/59756
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

D.E. (Sunny) Becker
Human Resources Research
Organization, Alexandria, VA, USA
sbecker@humrro.org

Yung Mei Leong
Independent Consultant, Hyattsville,
MD, USA
y.leong03@gmail.com

that insider attacks are the costliest to organizations
[2][3]. An active research area for development of
more effective detection and mitigation approaches is
the identification, validation, and integration of cyber
and behavioral (sociotechnical) indicators of insider
threat risk [4][5][6].
This paper describes continuing work on a
comprehensive insider threat ontology [6][7] that
supports research to develop more effective decision
support tools, facilitates insider threat program
evaluation s, and promotes understanding of the
complex insider threat domain. A hallmark of the
ontology—called Sociotechnical and Organizational
Factors for Insider Threat (SOFIT)—is the inclusion of
behavioral, social, and organizational factors in
addition to the cyber/technical factors traditionally
identified with insider threat risk. A general description
of SOFIT and its class structure is provided in [7].
While the ontology was based originally on a
unidimensional hierarchical taxonomy of factors,
relationships have been specified to more fully
characterize additional associations among insider
threat indicators and related constructs; these
associations extend the ontology beyond the simple
hierarchical taxonomy from which it was derived. It
now represents a collection of taxonomies. Indeed, this
paper focuses on how the additional specification of
associations among constructs yields a broader
ontology that further informs insider threat assessment
and mitigation. A primary objective of the current
research is to examine how individual indicators and
patterns of indicators contribute to judgments of insider
threat risk. Though preliminary and requiring further
research, results suggest both research and operational
implications favoring the inclusion of behavioral and
sociotechnical indicators.
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2. General model
A general context and framework that informs the
SOFIT ontology is shown in Fig. 1. This framework
depicts presumed underlying factors and processes at
work as one progresses along a critical pathway that
may culminate in a malicious insider exploit,
consistent with the Critical Pathway model described
in [8]. Since this framework does not describe
processes associated with unintentional (nonmalicious) insider threats [9][10], it only partially
informs SOFIT.
The model distinguishes personal (individual)
factors from external factors, and distal factors from
proximal
factors.
Personal
factors
include
psychological
constructs
and
predispositions,
internalized cultural norms and ideology, and
capabilities (i.e., knowledge, skills, abilities), which,
when combined with external factors, may increase the
individual’s motivation to act. Personal factors
comprise the proclivity or vulnerability to malicious
insider activity and include personal predispositions.
External factors include stressors, opportunities that
present themselves, and actions by the organization
that may impact motivation. Distal factors include
internal triggering processes, where personal and
external factors generate an emotional/cognitive
response that culminates in malicious intent. Proximal
factors are behaviors that lead to an attack. While
proximal factors are the most likely to be identified
following the crime, we suggest that distal factors
reflecting motivations may be most useful for proactive
approaches that attempt to identify individuals who
pose greater risks of committing these crimes.
Altogether, these processes describe the complex
mechanism at play for any potential malicious insider
threat. This framework is strongly influenced by earlier
works
that
describe
the
CMO
(capability/motivation/opportunity) model (e.g., [11]),

the critical pathway model [8], and numerous
behavioral/psychologically oriented works (e.g.,
[1][3][4][5][7]).
Each element of this framework can be directly or
indirectly measured. Following the approaches
described in [4] [12], we decomposed the various
constructs into a hierarchical set of factors that
supports analyses of data to infer observables,
indicators and threat behaviors. In this proactive
computational approach to insider threat mitigation,
data are processed to reveal observables; collections of
observables are analyzed to infer indicators
(collections or patterns of observables); indicators are
examined to infer target behaviors. Malicious (threat)
behaviors are combinations or sequences of indicators
and observables that represent a pattern of actions
associated with an exploit. Recognizing target threat
behaviors is therefore a complex, model-based
classification process that involves inferences about
multifaceted combinations or sequences of behavioral,
psychological, and technical indicators. This
interpretation of the threat assessment process provides
a key rationale for related modeling efforts and the
design of expert knowledge elicitation studies initially
reported in [6] and [7] and extended here.

3. SOFIT Framework
The SOFIT ontology derives from a systematic review,
analysis and synthesis of existing research, case
studies, and guidelines by the insider threat research
community. It is currently 6-7 levels deep, with 271
constructs defined as individual (human) factors and 49
as organizational factors [7]. Classes, which represent
objects with similar structure and properties, are
arranged hierarchically: subclasses or members of the
classes are referred to as indicators [4][5][12].

Figure 1. General Model
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Fig. 2 shows the main classes comprising the upper
levels of the hierarchy. Fundamentally, the ontology
attempts to describe individuals and organizations with
various characteristics that increase the likelihood that
an intentional or unintentional insider threat will occur.
The ontology addresses both malicious and nonmalicious (unintentional) insider threats, and it
distinguishes between actions performed by insiders
from those by organizations (e.g., problematic
responses to potential threats, poor institutional
policies, or security practices). SOFIT is broader and
deeper compared to other insider threat ontologies
(e.g., [13][14]). The constructs Factor (comprising
Individual and Organizational factors), Actor
(comprising Person and Organization) and Intention
(Malicious versus Non-Malicious) are at the top of the
Insider Threat hierarchy. Classes deeper in the
hierarchy largely consist of groupings of characteristics
at various levels of abstraction. The groups of classes
may be related by co-occurrence or cause and effect.

Characteristics at the lowest level of abstraction are
differentiated by threat type, indicator role, and level of
concern.
This paper primarily focuses on the individual
factors associated with insider threats; five parent
classes and underlying indicator classes are shown in
Fig. 3. The ontology accounts for both malicious and
non-malicious (unintentional) insider threats, and it
distinguishes between actions performed by employees
(as insiders) and actions performed by organizations
(such as problematic responses to potential threats,
poor institutional policies, or security practices).
Individual factors reflect behaviors, attitudes, personal
issues, sociocultural or ideological factors, and various
biographical (life narrative) factors that may indicate
increased risk. Protective factors (i.e., those that
decrease risk) are not considered in this work. This
branch of the taxonomy reflects the substantial body of
work by a diverse set of researchers and practitioners
focusing on concerning behaviors, sociocultural

Figure 3. SOFIT Ontology Higher-Level Classes

Figure 2. Individual Factor Branch of SOFIT Ontology
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factors, and psychological factors underlying insider
threats, as shown in Fig.3. Examination and discussion
of works relating to psychological constructs
(especially [5][15]) led us to differentiate enduring
psychological traits from dynamic states, consistent
with findings that these two constructs are reliably
distinct despite their admitted overlap (e.g., [16][17])
and with the diverse body of psychological research
that hinges on (e.g., [18][19][20]) or capitalizes on
(e.g., [21][22]) that distinction. Finally, the inclusion of
personal history and sociocultural factors derives from
research and case studies (e.g., [23][24][25][26]). We
adopted a “life narrative” factor construct based on the
notion that certain sociocultural factors may be
discerned from life narratives of individuals [27].
Fig. 4 depicts lower-level constructs within the
Individual Factor branch: viz., a decomposition of the
Job Performance class into two deeper-level
subclasses, “Cyberloafing” and “Negative Evaluation.”
Within each of these subclasses are observables (such
as “Excessive Personal Use of Work Computer”);
lower-level constructs are defined but not shown in the
figure. Measuring observables requires specifying and
implementing detectors associated with these

constructs (e.g., a detector for excessive personal use
of work computer might be number of visits to nonwork-related websites). SOFIT stops short of
specifying detectors, since these are organizationspecific and their specification would likely increase
the size of the ontology by an order of magnitude.

4. Associated Constructs
Our research team relied upon research literature
and our collective expert judgments to examine
numerous associations among the factors represented
in the ontology and relationships between these factors
and other relevant constructs. We considered possible
associations of the insider threat indicators with the
following threat types [1]:
●
●
●

●

●

Figure 4. Job Performance branch of
Individual Factor hierarchy

Insider Sabotage: An act by an insider to direct
specific harm toward an organization or its assets.
Insider Data Theft/Exfiltration: Theft of sensitive
information by an insider.
Insider Fraud: Modification, addition, deletion, or
theft, of an organization’s data for personal gain,
leading to an identity crime (e.g., identity theft,
credit card fraud).
Unintentional Insider Threat (UIT): An act or
failure to act by an insider, without malicious
intent, that causes harm or substantially increases
the probability of future harm to an organization or
its assets.
Workplace Violence: Any act or threat of physical
violence, harassment, intimidation, or other
threatening disruptive behavior that occurs at the
work site.

Based on our own judgments, the coauthors (FLG,
JP, DEB, YML) individually and by consensus
identified associations of individual factors with these
six threat types. Considered preliminary until validated
against independent expert knowledge or empirical
evidence, these additional relationships among
ontology constructs can support queries to generate
lists of factors associated with insider threat types.
Using
a
similar
individual-and-consensus
procedure, we considered possible relationships
between insider threat indicators and certain constructs
that help to describe an indicator’s role in the insider
threat exploit: Precipitating Event, Predisposition,
Behavioral Precursor, Technical Precursor, Access
Path, and Contextual Factor (these constructs are
defined in Table 1). Table 2 shows output from a query
listing factors associated with the role, Predisposition.
These factors come from different ontology classes
(e.g., Boundary Violation, Job Performance,
Psychological Factor/Enduring Trait).
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Table 1. SOFIT Constructs Characterizing an Indicator’s Role in Insider Threat Exploits
Construct

Definition

Examples

Precipitating
Event

An event that triggers or motivates the insider to carry
out an insider crime

1.1.4.3.4.4.5 Disciplinary Action
1.1.4.3.4.4.6. Passed over for promotion

Personal
Predisposition

A characteristic historically linked to a propensity to
exhibit malicious insider behavior

1.1.5.2.1.5. Low Honesty-Humility
1.1.5.2.2.1.1. Manipulative
1.1.5.2.2.2. Narcissism

Behavioral
Precursor

An individual action, event, or condition that involves
personal or interpersonal behaviors and that precedes and
is associated with insider activity

1.1.5.1.2.5. Disgruntlement
1.1.5.1.2.6. Overly Critical

Technical
Precursor

An individual action, event, or condition that involves
computer or electronic media and that precedes and is
associated with malicious insider activity

1.1.3.6.3. Delete or edit audit logs
1.1.3.7. Suspicious Communication

Access Path

Sequence of one or more access points along a critical
path (also known as "attack vector" or "kill chain")

1.1.3.4.4. Unauthorized storage device
1.1.3.4.1. Attempts to access prohibited filesharing websites

Contextual
Variable

Factor that adds context (not necessarily predictive)

1.1.4.2.1.3. Unexplained affluence
1.1.4.3.1. Age
1.1.4.3.2. Gender

Table 2. Factors associated with the role “Predispositions”
1.1.1.
1.1.1.2.
1.1.1.2.1.
1.1.2.
1.1.2.2.
1.1.2.2.6.
1.1.5.2.
1.1.5.2.1.
1.1.5.2.1.1.
1.1.5.2.1.2.
1.1.5.2.1.2.1.
1.1.5.2.1.2.2.
1.1.5.2.1.2.3.
1.1.5.2.1.3.
1.1.5.2.1.3.1.

Boundary Violation
Blurred Professional Boundaries
Excessive Socialization
Job Performance
Negative Evaluation
Missing or Late To Meetings
Enduring Trait
Personality Dimensions
Emotional Instability/ Neuroticism
Low- Conscientiousness
Unreliable
Impulsivity
Poor Time Management
Disagreeableness
Socially Averse

The primary associations of the ontology describe
the hierarchical nature of the indicators. The
associations between parent classes and child classes
such as those illustrated in Table 2 are the major
organizing principle for the indicators. Role type
associations are considered secondary because
indicators within a role are more heterogenous and
less closely related. However, this perspective is
based on narrative evidence alone. Indeed, it is
possible to develop an alternative ontological
structure based on roles instead of the class structure
described in Section 3. It is therefore appropriate to
ask: What aspects of the ontology (e.g., individual

1.1.5.2.1.3.2.
1.1.5.2.1.4.
1.1.5.2.1.5.
1.1.5.2.2.
1.1.5.2.2.1.
1.1.5.2.2.1.1.
1.1.5.2.2.2.
1.1.5.2.2.2.1.
1.1.5.2.2.2.2.
1.1.5.2.2.2.3.
1.1.5.2.2.2.4.
1.1.5.2.2.3.
1.1.5.2.2.3.1.
1.1.5.2.2.3.2.
1.1.5.2.2.3.3.

Rebellious- Nonconforming
Excitement-seeking
Low Honesty- Humility
Dark Triad
Machiavellianism
Manipulative
Narcissism
Self- Centered
Grandiosity
Rejects Criticism
Lack of Empathy
Psychopathy
Callousness
Lack of Remorse
Sadism

indicators, their roles, and parent class relationships)
might best account for expert judgments of insider
threat? We conducted an expert knowledge elicitation
study to address this and related questions.

5. Expert Knowledge Elicitation Study
The ontology class structure is a framework for
describing the domain of insider threat indicators.
Further, SOFIT’s structure encapsulates an inherent
schema that we hypothesize analysts use to make
judgments about insider threat risk. For example, an
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analyst may not be gravely concerned about a case
within an organization unless an indicator from the
data manipulation class is present. Likewise, the role
of an indicator may provide valuable information
about how an analyst interprets a case. For example,
an analyst may deem a case less worthy of further
investigation because there is no precipitating event
or other factor indicating a motive. Therefore, the
class structure and role structure may provide
explanatory power for modeling expert judgments of
potential insider threat cases.

5.1. Research Questions
Our research questions center on the hypothesis
that expert judgments of the threat/risk rating (level
of concern) for an indicator in isolation will provide a
relatively powerful way to predict judgments of
combinations of indicators (i.e., threat/risk rankings
of cases). This is suggested by previous findings
[5][7], but here we focus on more specific modelbased questions:
1) Do the threat/risk ratings for individual
indicators predict the threat ranks of cases?
(Sum-of-Risk model)
2) Does a count of the number of indicators from
each of the parent classes in a case predict the
rank of the case? (Class-Count model)
3) Does a count of the number of indicators from
each of the 6 possible roles predict the rank of
the case? (Role-Count model)
4) Do the class-count and role-count models
contribute independently to the prediction of
case rank?
5) Do the class-count and role-count models predict
case rank above and beyond sum-of-risk model?

5.2. Method and Procedure
Thirteen experts from at least five participating
organizations representing both research and
operational experience participated in the study.
Participants were recruited via a snowball
recruitment method (seeded from our contacts across
the research/operational communities). All had more
than 5 total years of experience in insider threat or
related fields, and 12 experts had 11 or more years of
experience. In Part I of the study (survey open for 3
months), each of the participants provided ratings of
level of concern for 202 indicators (out of the 271
individual indicators) in the ontology [ratings were
on a 0-100 scale, where 0 = no concern at all and
100 = gravest concern about an actual exploit or
strong inclination/likelihood of committing an
exploit). Seven of these experts, all with 11 or more

years of experience, opted to go on to Part II of the
study (open for 2 months after Part I). In Part II,
participants ranked 45 stratified random cases
presented as combinations of 2 to 5 individual
indicators. The cases were constructed to balance the
number of indicators and degree of concern as
considered by the experimenters who judged cases as
low, medium, or high concern. Except for five cases
that were given to everyone as “anchors”, the
remaining 40 cases varied across participants. An
example of a case (considered by the experimenters
to represent high concern) is the following, with
indicators enclosed in brackets:
[Resigned] [Extreme Discontent] [Establish Backdoor]
[Transfer Large Amount of Data] [Strong Reaction to
Organizational Sanctions]

Cases comprised simply the list of indicator labels
(as above); definitions of indicators were available
for review. Instructions for this ranking task were to
sort cases into five "bins" corresponding to increasing
levels of concern (Low, Low-Moderate, Moderate,
Moderate-High, Extreme), and then to rank-order the
cases in each bin from highest concern to lowest
concern. This results in a rank-ordering for the set of
cases. The 315 cases ranked by the 7 experts were the
unit of analysis for all regression analyses.

5.3. Results
5.3.1. Quantitative Models. We examined five
models that attempt to predict the expert’s ranking of
the level of threat in the cases, based on the indicators
present in them. We use the variable, R, to denote the
predicted level of threat or risk specified by each of
these models.
• Counting model. R = Σxi, where xi has the value
of 1 if indicator i is present, otherwise 0. Thus, if
there are n indicators in a case, the risk will be n,
irrespective of any differences in threat level for
individual indicators.
• Regression model. R = Σbixi, where bi is the
regression weight for indicator i. The regression
model estimates many empirically-derived
weights to predict the case rankings.
• Sum-of-Risk model. The risk for a case is the
sum of the ratings of concern (ri) for the
individual indicators contained in the case, i.e., R
= Σrixi, where the ri represents the rating of
concern for indicator i.
• Class-Count model sums the weights based on
the parent class for each indicator represented in
a case, i.e., R = Σcj(i)xi, where cj(i) is an
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•

empirically-derived weight for the parent class
associated with indicator i.
Role-Count model counts the number of roles
represented, or R = Σrk(i)xi,, where rk(i) is an
empirically-derived weight for the role
associated with indicator i.

5.3.2. Modeling Results. Consistent with previous
findings [5][7], the predictive power of a Counting
model (using only the number of indicators observed)
provides a logical lower bound on our measure of
predictive strength (R2 = 0.26); whereas, a
Regression model freely estimating the weight of
each indicator on rank provides a logical upper bound
(R2 = 0.76).
We compared the performance of the other three
models with the upper and lower bound alternatives
presented by the Counting and Regression models.
The Sum-of-Risk model predicted the rankings
nearly twice as well as the Counting model (R2 =
0.48). The Class-Count model predicted case ranks
(R2 = 0.54) slightly better than the Sum-of-Risk
model. Table 3 shows the beta weights and
significance levels for the parent class indicators in
the Class-Count model1. Note that because lower
ranks represent higher concern, negative regression
weights are expected.
The Role-Count model (R2 = 0.42) was
somewhat less predictive of case ranks than the Sumof-Risk model. Table 4 shows the beta weights and
significance levels for the Role-Count model.
Notably, and surprisingly considering that all factors
are assumed to reflect some degree of risk/threat, the
role type of Personal Predisposition attained a
positive weight (β = 0.15).
Including both the class-structure and the rolestructure in the analyses provides explanatory power;
however, there is a high potential for overlap. The
relative incremental validities of parent class and role
type were examined to determine if the contributions
are independent. Role type predicted significantly
beyond parent class, F(1,312) = 6.237, p = .013, ΔR2
= 0.010. Similarly, parent class predicted
significantly beyond role type, F(1,312) = 58.447, p
< .001, ΔR2 = 0.094. These results supported the
notion that parent class and role type provide
independent contributions to the expert judgments of
threat rank. Although statistically significant, the
1

The 29 parent classes in Table 3 differ slightly from the
most current representation (Fig 3); subsequent to the
study, some indicator classes (e.g., attendance, affect) were
placed lower in the hierarchy and therefore do not appear in
the figure. We replicated the analyses using the current
class structure, obtaining similar weights and an R2 of 0.52.

incremental validity of role type over parent class
was small, which implies parent class accounts for
most of the variance and that the independent
variance contributed by role type is relatively limited.
Table 3. Weights for Count of Parent Class
Parent Class
Boundary Violation
Concerning Work Habits
Blurred Professional Boundaries
Interpersonal Problems
Boundary Probing
Social Engineering
Minor Policy Violation
Security Violation
Major Security Violation
Job Performance
Cyberloafing
Attendance
Negative Evaluation
Cybersecurity Violation
Authentication/Authorization
Data Access Patterns
Network Patterns
Data Transfer Patterns
Command Usage
Data Manipulation
Suspicious Communication
Life Narrative
Criminal Record
Financial Concern
Personal History/Major Life Changes
Behavioral Health Issues
Disloyalty
Radical Beliefs
Suspicious Foreign Travel
Psychological Factor
Affect
Attitude
(Concerning) Personality Dimensions
Dark Triad
*p<.05

**p<.01

β
-0.13***
0.00
-0.16***
-0.21***
-0.05
-0.12***
-0.28***
-0.31***
-0.05
0.03
-0.13**
-0.21***
-0.23***
-0.32***
-0.33***
-0.22***
-0.27***
-0.21***
-0.07
-0.07
-0.08
-0.07
-0.21***
0.00
-0.18***
-0.09*
-0.23***
-0.02
-0.02

***p<.001

Hierarchical regression was conducted to
determine how much variance the Class-Count and
Role-Count models account for beyond the Sum-ofRisk model. In the first step, the Sum-of-Risk model
was considered independently to determine the
baseline variance accounted for, R2 = 0.48. The other
two models were added in the second step and any
increase in model fit was attributed to the added
predictors, ΔR2 = 0.04. As expected, given the small
independent prediction, parent class predicted beyond
the sum of ratings of concern (β = -0.34, p < .001);
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whereas, role type does not (β = -0.09, p = 0.25)
when both structures are in the same model (see
Table 5).
Ultimately, the variance in expert ratings of
concern in isolation predicted level of concern for a
case relatively well. However, the judgment process
for cases is not solely explained as a simple
summation of the individual risks. The additional
prediction provided by parent class implies that the
adjustment from a simple sum involves the parent
class structure in some fashion. The lack of additional
prediction from role type implies that the adjustment
either does not involve role type or that the role type
overlaps with parent class or ratings of concern.
Table 4. Weights for Count of Role Type
β
-0.13**
0.15***
-0.19***
-0.30***
-0.34***
-0.14*

Role Type
Precipitating Event**
Personal Predisposition***
Behavioral Precursor***
Technical Precursor***
Access Path***
Contextual Variable*
*p<.05

**p<.01

***p<.001

Table 5. Incremental Prediction of Case Rank
over Sum-of-Risk
Predictor
Step 1***
Sum-of-Risk***
Step 2***
Sum-of-Risk***
Parent Class***
Role Type
*p<.05

**p<.01

R2
0.484***

β
-0.70***

0.525***
-0.33***
-0.34***
-0.09
***p<.001

6. Discussion
The indicator level-of-concern values and number
of indicators from each parent class predict expert
judges’ ranking of insider threat cases. As expected,
the indicators for major security violation, network
pattern, and data transfer pattern were the most
predictive of the threat ranks for cases. Indicator role
type was a substantially weaker predictor of case
rankings, with, technical precursors and access path
indicators showing the strongest relationship.
When paired with ratings of concern to make
predictions about case rankings, the number of parent
classes represented in the indicators (class structure)
outweighed the number of role types (role structure).
Relative to the Counting model and the freely
estimated Regression model, the predictive strength

of the Class-Count model lends support for the
ontological structure that was built for SOFIT. These
results support the notion that the ontological
structure aligns with the internal schema used by
experts to make judgments about the relative concern
of insider threat cases. In contrast, the mixed results
of the Role-Count model may reflect the fact that
judgments of level of concern at the individual
indicator level matter more than judgments of
indicator role. This suggests that the raters considered
both psychological and technical indicators in rough
proportion to their risk. Future research should
investigate the conditions in which indicator role
might have a more substantial impact on judgments
of insider threat risk.
As constructed, the SOFIT ontology specifies
concerning indicators, and consistent with this
construction, our study showed that expert ratings of
concern for all individual indicators were at least
somewhat concerning on average (i.e., >20 on a 100point scale). Indicators relating to the personal
predisposition role type tended to reflect cases that
were of lesser concern (positive β weight in Table 4).
Since role type does not add validity to level of
concern, this result likely reflects the fact that the
personal predisposition role has the lowest average
concern. Because the number of indicators in a case
is limited, the roles do not occur independently in the
sample of cases. This means that a case that includes
one or more personal predisposition indicators would
be likely to include fewer indicators from more
concerning roles, such as technical precursors or
access paths.

7. Conclusions
The results reported here support the inclusion of
behavioral/social indicators of insider threat in
modeling expert judgments, and further suggest that
operational contexts relying on analyst judgment may
benefit from decision support tools that use the
SOFIT ontology. More specifically, we conclude that
decision support tools for insider threat assessments
should take account of the class structure. Further
research is warranted to assess the possible impact of
indicator role types.

7.1. Limitations
The results of the current and previous expert
knowledge elicitation studies [7] are proxies for
empirically investigating the predictive strength of
indicators in an operational setting. Validity of
proposed approaches and models cannot be faithfully
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determined without testing in real operational
settings. The present line of research on insider threat
indicator structure seems to warrant further
investigation using real data with ground truth to
validate the models beyond the prediction of expert
judgments.

acknowledge contributions from team members KB
Laskey, J Lee and A. Zaidi in developing the
ontology.
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